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Actual Farmer Market Timing 
 
B. Wade Brorsen and Kim B. Anderson  
 
  One maxim that has been circulating among farmers is that most farmers sell in the lower third of the 
market.  This maxim is soundly rejected using data from Oklahoma elevators.  In fact, roughly half of producers sell 
in the upper third of the market.  Thus, there does not seem to be a great need for producers to hire a market advisor 
to do their marketing for them.  But, some farmers do store longer than is optimal and they could be encouraged to 
sell sooner after harvest.  In the short run, farmers sold after price increases and held after price decreases.  Price 
movements in the days after a large number of sales were no different than price movements after few sales.  While 
farmers are noise traders in the short run, it does appear that they are responding to long-run market signals. Even 
though there may be room for improvement, it appears that farmers are doing a good job of deciding when to sell 
their wheat.   
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  Considerable progress has been made in making marketing strategy recommendations to 
farmers.  The dominant paradigm is the efficient market hypothesis that suggests that little 
profits can be made by trying to time when to sell wheat. The paradigm says that farmers will 
receive an average price on average. 
 
A view that is now showing up at extension meetings is that farmers do worse than 
average.  At a recent Farm Bureau meeting, for example, the master of ceremonies made the 
statement, ￿producers tend to sell on the bottom third of the market.￿  In a mid-March 2001 issue 
of the Progressive Farmer, Dr. G. A. Barnaby from Kansas State University was quoted as 
saying, ￿Maybe that￿s why most farmers sell in the bottom third of the market￿ (Batchelor p. 25).  
The research question then is do farmers really sell in the bottom third of the market or is this 
just a clever marketing gimmick by market advisory services?   
 
The idea of farmers selling in the bottom third of the market is not without theoretical 
foundation.  New results from behavioral finance find that people have systematic psychological 
biases (Brorsen and Anderson).  These biases could result in herding behavior in such a way that 
the majority could always be wrong.  A study by Slusher is the only one that we know of that has 
ever addressed the issue of actual farmer performance and it is based on a narrow survey of 
Indiana corn farmers done 15 years ago. There is an immediate need for rigorous research to 
either challenge or support the claim that farmers sell in the bottom third of the market. 
 
  The general objective of this project will be to determine the actual pricing performance 
of Oklahoma wheat producers.  The two specific objectives: (a) determine if most Oklahoma 
wheat producers sell in the bottom 1/3 of the market, and (b) determine if there is any pattern in 
when Oklahoma wheat producers tend to sell. 
 
  Granger causality tests are used to determine the pattern in when producers sell. Such 
tests are tests of whether producers are noise traders (Black; Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold). 
Noise traders trade on noise as if it were information. Positive feedback noise traders buy after 





    Daily wheat purchases and actual sales prices were obtained from three Oklahoma 
elevators.  Data were entered and carefully screened for errors. Oklahoma￿s wheat producing 
area is in the western part of the state.  The three elevators were selected to be in the north, 
central, and southern parts of the wheat-producing region. The daily reported prices in each 
location were collected from the Oklahoma Crop Reporting Service for use on days when there 
were no sales. 
 
  Data were collected over June 1992 through May 2001. The southern, central and northern 
elevators handled 1.2, 1.25, and 2.3 million bushels with transactions of 1,572, 789, and 837 per 
year. 
 
  Oklahoma is closer to the Gulf than other wheat-producing regions and thus prices in 
Oklahoma tend to be higher than in northern states. Benirschka and Binkley argued that grain 
closest to the market would be stored the shortest period. Thus, we would expect most of 
Oklahoma￿s wheat to be sold early in the crop year. Indeed, the Oklahoma State University 
extension recommendation is to sell all wheat by November of each year. Oklahoma￿s harvest is 
in June but seasonal price lows are in July.  Thus, Oklahoma producers particularly in the south 
have a strong incentive to sell at harvest. Therefore, Oklahoma data should provide a strong test 
of whether farmers sell in the lower third of the market. 
 
  What it means to sell in the lower third of the market had to be defined.  We assume a 12-
month cash-marketing window.  Past research has shown that producers make little use of 
futures markets. Forward contracts in these markets were only 1-3% of sales and about 1% was 
carried across crop years, so the 12-month cash-marketing-only window seems realistic for 
Oklahoma wheat producers. Jirik et al. use a 24-month window in their analyses of market 
advisory services and 50% of sales are before harvest. While pre-harvest sales may be common 





  The prices available in the market were calculated by the actual price minus storage costs of 
$0.00085/day and interest costs of the prime rate plus two percent.  Most grain was stored at the 
elevator, but some was stored on farm. Actual storage charges were provided in some cases and 
the storage costs used are quite close. The actual sales price and the daily reported price differed 
by less than a cent per bushel. Net prices were calculated for each transaction and for each day of 
the marketing year.  The percent of bushels sold in the bottom third, bottom half, and upper third 
of the net prices offered that year was calculated.   
 
  For farmers to consistently do poorly, there must be some pattern in when they sell. 
Behavioral finance theory (Brorsen and Anderson) suggests some of the patterns that might exist. The most important pattern to test is whether farmers are more likely to sell before price goes up 
than before it goes down.  The approach will also be used to determine if sales vary by day of the 
week or time of the month. The framework to do such tests is Granger causality (Sanders, Irwin 
and Leuthold). Granger causality is used because spurious results can be obtained by regressing 
one autocorrelated series upon another.  
 
  The two variables in the bivariate autoregression are the frequency of sales on day t (dayt) 
and the change in reported prices on day t (dpricet). Daily bushels sold was also considered as an 
alternative dependent variable to frequency of sales, but was not used because of severe 
nonnormality created due to some very large sales. Results using bushels also showed prices 
leading sales when a square-root transformation was used for the dependent variable, even 
though the regression had a severe loss of power due to the nonnormality. Only the prices for the 
northern elevator were used in the bivariate regression to avoid any possible influence of sales 
being clustered at harvest for the other locations. 
 
  Seasonality was modeled with sine and cosine functions of frequency one year, six months, 
and four months. Day of the week was modeled with dummy variables. Friday was omitted so 
the coefficients should be interpreted as the difference from Friday. 
 
  The frequency of sales is a count variable. The two traditional ways of modeling a count 
variable are (1) ordinary least squares with a square-root transformation of the dependent 
variable and (2) a Poisson regression model. The square-root model failed to provide residuals 
that were normally distributed so the Poisson model was used instead. Both approaches gave 
similar answers regarding prices leading sales, but the Poisson did show considerably more 
statistical significance. An asymmetric response was also considered. Producers were slightly 
more responsive to price increases than price decreases. No new insight was gained from the 
more complex model so the simpler model is reported here. 
 
  The model for change in price is estimated with ordinary least squares. No unit-root tests 
were conducted since the variable of interest is the change in price. Literature has shown that 
high-frequency cash prices can be well modeled as unit-root processes even though low-
frequency cash prices are clearly mean reverting. 
 
  The lengths of lag were selected using sequential F-tests with a maximum lag length of 
eight. The length of lag was allowed to differ across the two models, but not within a model. 
Two lags were selected for change in price and eight lags were selected for frequency of sales. 
Numerous diagnostic checks were conducted. Neither current model passes all tests. There is 





  Table 1 shows the proportions of sales occurring each month. The southern elevator has 
56% of sales at harvest during June. The southern area is one of the first to harvest wheat and so 
producers sell immediately before prices reach harvest lows. Producers at the northern area sell 
only 9% of their wheat in June. These producers apparently receive a return to storage with October being the month with the most wheat marketed. The 29% of sales in March-May for the 
northern area is higher than expected. There may be some producers waiting for high prices that 
never come and then selling at the end of the marketing window. The behavior is consistent with 
myopic loss aversion. This could be due to what Kahneman and Riepe (p. 60) call the disposition 
effect, which is the reluctance of investors to realize their losses. There is a difference between 
markets being efficient and producers making efficient decisions. Future research should 
investigate whether some Oklahoma producers need to be encouraged to sell earlier in the crop 
year. Anderson recommends that Oklahoma producers sell before the end of the calendar year 
unless they want to hold for tax reasons. Some Oklahoma producers appear to be making 
inefficient decisions. Certainly it does appear that most producers are responding to market 
signals to sell their wheat early in the marketing year. 
 
  Table 2 presents the test of the primary hypothesis of this study: do farmers sell in the lower 
one-third of the market. The hypothesis is soundly rejected. Not only do most not sell in the 
lower third, nearly half sell in the upper third. This is true even at the northern elevator where 
harvest sales are light. Again the results show that farmers are responding to market signals of 
when to time their sales. The argument that most farmers sell in the bottom 1/3 of the market has 
been used to argue that farmers should use market advisory services or marketing pools that seek 
to obtain an average price. Since that is not the case, there does not seem to be any strong need 
for most producers to change the way that they time their sales. The results do not necessarily 
mean that producers have an ability to predict price. It may simply mean that producers are 
receiving a return from responding to market signals of whether to store or sell. 
 
  The returns that producers received above a simple twelve-month average are presented in 
Table 3. The returns are substantially larger at the southern elevator. But, even at the northern 
elevator, producers beat the twelve-month average by 9 cents/bushel. Elevators in some parts of 
the country have begun to offer contracts that achieve the 12-month average by selling some 
wheat each day. The producers clearly beat such a strategy. Of course, the results do not rule out 
using a six-month average. Anderson recommends that Oklahoma wheat producers sell 1/3 in 
June, 1/3 in September, and 1/3 in November and thus a six-month window would be more 
consistent with his recommendation. Anderson may need to modify his recommendation to 
increase the proportion sold in June for southern Oklahoma producers. 
 
  The Poisson regression shows the strong positive influence of price on the frequency of 
sales (Table 4). Thus, the producers are negative feedback traders. Negative feedback traders 
provide liquidity so it is possibly a profitable strategy if price changes are negatively 
autocorrelated. These findings are opposite of the positive feedback found with market sentiment 
indexes that are designed for small speculators (Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold; De Bondt; Solt 
and Statman). The feedback is a long-memory process since more than the first is statistically 
significant. Seasonality and day of the week are also significant with the most sales occurring on 
Monday and the least on Thursday. 
 
  Lagged sales are not statistically significant in predicting price changes. Therefore, 
producers are noise traders in the short run. The negative coefficients on both lags of price 
changes do suggest some potential return to providing liquidity through negative feedback 
trading. The negative coefficient on the second lag of sales is significant at the 10% level which is mildly suggestive that producers may be selling at good times. Seasonality and day of the 
week are not statistically significant. The results in table 5 again support the idea that farmers are 




    The hypothesis, ￿wheat producers sell in the bottom 1/3 of the market,￿ was not 
supported by this research. Thus farmers do not need to use market advisory services or 
marketing pools that seek to obtain an average price since they are getting a better than average 
price. Oklahoma has a strong price incentive to sell early in the crop year. Regions far from 
consuming areas and with later harvest dates can be expected to greater returns to storage than 
Oklahoma producers.  Thus, while a twelve-month pool would work poorly in Oklahoma, it 
might be fine in other states. 
 
  In the short run farmers are negative feedback traders since they sell after price increases 
and tend to hold after price decreases. They are also noise traders since their sales did not predict 
price changes. Thus producers have been successful in deciding whether to sell in June or in 
March, but they have had little or no success in deciding whether to sell today or tomorrow. 
Thus, extension-marketing programs that have ignored day-to-day movements and concentrated 
on how to respond to market signals of when to time sales still seems the best way to go. There is 
some indication of producers storing grain longer than is economical, so there is benefit from an 
extension program that encourages farmers to sell. Inaction can result from the psychological 
mistake of being reluctant to realize losses. The results also imply that producers are doing a 
good job of marketing and they do not need to invest more in marketing. Producers should spend 
scarce management resources concentrating on being a low-cost producer or on marketing 
activities that add value rather than trying to predict what the price is going to be tomorrow or 
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